

27 January 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR : John Gross

SUBJECT : The Key Question Remains Unanswered

1. What people, using what gadgets make up this "overall foreign intelligence system" that LBJ expects RH to not only coordinate and guide, but in addition, to achieve significant improvements in its organization, management and effectiveness? Until we have the answer to this question we cannot really lay out the overall job of the DCI nor how he can best carry it out. It is the same question that was asked by Bob Macy on behalf of the BOB over thirteen years ago and it was the key reason for the establishment of the NIPE Staff. Isn't it about time that we zeroed in on this key target rather than continuing to work on many individual bits and pieces of the Community and continuing to get a multiplicity of very fine pictures individually but never being able to put them together into an intelligible mosaic of the Community as a whole?

2. In line with the above thinking I suggest that the most profitable "consultative" work I could do during the life of my present contract is to concentrate on the following:

a. The development of a simple "Intelligence Community Resource Data Card" that would have on it the type of information needed to enable reasonable men with professional intelligence experience to determine, first, whether the "effort" described should properly be included in the intelligence system the DCI is responsible for and, second, what degree of concern should be have with respect to its coordination, guidance, organization, management and effectiveness?

b. The development of a system to obtain the information needed to answer the key question outlined above through the use of intelligence channels; the Washington end of the channel in each case would be the USIB members. In other words we would make use of what used to be described as the intelligence "technical" channel from "intelligence chiefs" in Washington to their counterparts in the field. We would be avoiding, and this is vital, program,

budgetary or command channels. In other words, we want a network that stays strictly within the intelligence family at all times.

c. Establishment of a USIB group (it can be ad hoc) which will receive the initial submission of data cards and first, make the initial determination as to those efforts that belong in the "system" and those that do not and, second, the initial determination as to the degree to which the DCI and the USIB should concern themselves with each of the efforts determined to be "in the system".

2. This whole exercise should be a DCI/USIB action from start to finish and coordinated within the USIB family every step of the way. All that is needed to start it is for the DCI to simply tell USIB that he is going to seek the answer to this key question from the intelligence family, that you are going to manage the effort for him, that Nate Fitts, with the aid of his friendly consultant, will be your boy on the job, and then ask each USIB member concerned (including I would hope the Army, Navy and Air Force intelligence chiefs) to name a man to work with Nate until the job is done.

3: My basic idea is that the approach suggested can be played soft-sell and low-key all the way, deep within the intelligence family at all times, avoid the sensitive issue of the DCI's authority involved with other peoples resources, etc., and keep focused on one simple question which the DCI certainly has a right to ask, "What in Hell am I responsible for?"

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A/D/DCI/NIPE

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